Vaultaire alternative with Face ID, Secure Enclave keys and no analytics
Mirage Vault is the Vaultaire alternative for people who want the same kind of honest encryption plus Face ID and a key the Secure Enclave protects. Vaultaire states AES-256-GCM with a pattern unlock, says on its own technical page that the Secure Enclave is not used for the cipher, lists no Face ID, and has analytics on by default. Mirage encrypts the same way, wraps the key with the Secure Enclave, unlocks with Face ID and contains no analytics.
We make Mirage Vault. This page compares it with other apps using only what each app's App Store listing or its own website states, read on 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-31. "—" means the listing does not say. Nothing here is a review, and we have not tested the other apps on a device. If a fact about your app is wrong, tell us and we will correct it.
Why a Vaultaire alternative is a narrow question
Vaultaire is the app in this category that took encryption seriously in public: it names AES-256-GCM, describes a chunked file format, states its PBKDF2 round counts, and ships a decoy vault and a duress pattern. Most vault apps do none of that. So anyone looking for a Vaultaire alternative is not looking for “more secure” in general; they are looking for three specific things Vaultaire’s own pages say it does not have.
- Face ID. Vaultaire unlocks by pattern only; its listing does not mention Face ID.
- The Secure Enclave. Its technical page says the Secure Enclave is not used for the cipher. The key comes from the pattern and a device salt, which means a copy of the files can be attacked offline.
- No analytics. Its privacy label is “Data Linked to You”, and analytics are on by default.
Mirage Vault was built with those three in mind, and otherwise follows the same philosophy: encryption on the device, no account, a recovery phrase, a decoy, a duress pattern.
Vaultaire and Mirage Vault on facts
| What we compared | Mirage Vault | Vaultaire |
|---|---|---|
| Encryption | AES-256-GCM, 1 MiB chunks, a key per file | AES-256-GCM (vendor page) |
| How the key is protected | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 ≥ 600,000, wrapped by a Secure Enclave key | PBKDF2 from the pattern; Secure Enclave not used for the cipher (vendor page) |
| Unlock | Pattern drawn anywhere, Face ID, PIN backup | Pattern; Face ID not stated |
| Account | None | No account stated |
| App Store privacy label | No analytics, no account (label pending publication) | Data Linked to You |
| Decoy vault | Yes (Pro) | Yes |
| Break-in alerts | Yes, photo + time + pattern, no GPS (Pro) | — |
| Duress / wipe code | Yes: Wipe Key (Pro) | Yes |
| Disguise | Icon only; the label stays "Mirage" (Pro) | — |
| Backup | Encrypted iCloud backup, free, ciphertext only | — |
| Platforms | iPhone | iPhone |
| Checked on | 2026-11-01 | 2026-10-19 |
Sources: Vaultaire: apps.apple.com/us/app/id6758529311, vaultaire.app/about. Mirage Vault facts are from the app's source and its 2026-10-31 security audit.
Where the two differ, row by row
Key protection. Both derive a key from the pattern with PBKDF2. Mirage then wraps the result with ECIES on a P-256 key in the Secure Enclave, created with the private-key-usage policy, so the wrapping cannot be done off the device. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 runs at least 600,000 rounds, calibrated to at least 250 ms per attempt. Vaultaire’s stated rounds are higher for its recovery phrase; the Secure Enclave step is the difference that changes the attack model.
Face ID. Mirage’s Face ID key is a second Secure Enclave key bound to the enrolled faces, with no passcode fallback, and it never opens the decoy. How Face ID works in Mirage has the details.
Analytics. Mirage contains no third-party code; nothing is reported to anyone. Vaultaire’s listing states analytics on by default with an opt-out.
Break-in alerts. Mirage records a front-camera frame, the time and the pattern drawn, sealed to the vault’s key (Pro). Vaultaire’s listing does not state break-in alerts.
Disguise. Mirage changes the icon (Pro) and says plainly that the label stays “Mirage”. Vaultaire’s listing does not state a disguise.
What is the same. Named cipher, chunked files, no account, decoy vault, duress pattern, a recovery phrase as the only way onto a new device, iPhone only.
Moving from Vaultaire to Mirage Vault
- Export from Vaultaire to Photos
Use Vaultaire’s export to put the photos back in the Photos app, in batches.
- Set up Mirage and save the phrase
Pattern, Face ID, recovery phrase from the checklist. Confirm the phrase with Check one word.
- Import and delete the originals
+ › Add from Photos. On the toast, Delete, then confirm iOS and empty Recently Deleted in Photos.
- Set up the protections again
Decoy vault and Wipe Key are per app: set them in Mirage’s Settings › Protection (Mirage Pro), then clear and delete the Vaultaire vault.
Mirage Vault is free for up to 100 photos and 10 videos; the decoy, Wipe Key, break-in alerts and disguise are Mirage Pro, listed on pricing.